Rights

Rights dominate most modern understandings of what actions are proper and which institutions are just. There are two major contemporary philosophical approaches to explaining which fundamental rights of conduct there are, and why these rights should be respected. These two approaches are broadly identifiable as deontological and consequentialist. Deontological (the study of duty) would argue the ends do not justify the means. A consequentialist would argue that the ends do justify the means.


Deontological theories hold that human beings have attributes that make it fitting to ascribe certain rights to them, and make respect for these rights appropriate. Deontological approach is based in natural rights. All natural rights deal with attributes humans have by their nature, and which make respect for certain rights appropriate. Human attributes like free will, the need for psychological goods, or the ability to live with moral virtue.


Consequentialist theories hold that respect for particular rights is a means for bringing about some optimal distribution of interests. The consequentialist is based in rule utilitarianism. Rights are rules created with goal to provide the optimal distribution of interests. The most common objection to grounding rights in such a theory is that the resulting rights will be too flimsy. Why should it not be a rule of such a system, for example, that one should frame an innocent man if this would prevent a major riot? Why should it not be a rule that one should "violate" the right of an innocent not to be killed if this would prevent the killings of two innocents elsewhere?


Justice would support deontological ethics because to force someone to forfeit something which belongs to them is not just. To demand justice one must be willing to give justice. If someone were to suffer for the good of five people, a consequentialist would believe the suffering to be good, while a deontologist would believe forcing someone to suffer is wrong. Then there is the larger question of who decides what is ‘good.’ It would not matter as much to a deontologist.